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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Two prisoners at a facility for sex offenders who have 
exhibited "repetitive and compulsive" behaviorfiled this 
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that a recently 
enacted New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10, violated 
their constitutional rights by restricting their access to 
pornographic materials. The District Court concluded that 
the statute was unconstitutional and permanently enjoined 
state officials from enforcing it. Waterman v. Verniero, 12 
F.Supp.2d 378 (D.N.J. 1998). Subsequent to the District 
Court's decision, the state adopted regulations clarifying 
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the statute's scope. Informed by these regulations, we hold 
that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge lacks merit, and 
we therefore reverse the decision of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
Plaintiffs Richard Waterman and Michael Curtis are 
convicted pedophiles1 incarcerated at the Adult Diagnostic 
and Treatment Center ("A.D.T.C.") in Avenel, New Jersey. 
The New Jersey Department of Corrections ("D.O.C.") 
operates the A.D.T.C. for the sole purpose of housing and 
rehabilitating sex offenders (i.e., pedophiles, child 
molesters, and rapists) who have exhibited behavior that is 
"repetitive and compulsive." Non-repetitive and non- 
compulsive sex offenders are housed in other institutions 
with the general prison population. The A.D.T.C. houses 
750 inmates, approximately 70% of whom are pedophiles. 
 
The A.D.T.C.'s therapeutic staff provides the inmates with 
intensive sex offender treatment, employing a four-step 
program that "is designed to present information and 
therapeutic experiences in a progressive order to ameliorate 
the offender's proclivity towards criminal sexual behavior." 
App. at 127. Each step focuses on concepts of victim 
empathy and the offender's sexual deviance. D.O.C. officials 
believe that this type of treatment can reduce recidivism. 
 
In 1998, the New Jersey Assembly and Senate 
unanimously enacted a bill that banned "sexually oriented 
and obscene materials" from the A.D.T.C.2 Governor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Plaintiff Waterman is currently serving a 54-year prison sentence for 
sexually abusing a nine-year-old girl. Waterman has two previous 
convictions for pedophiliac offenses--one for abducting and raping an 
eleven-year-old girl and the other for fondling a nine-year-old girl. 
 
Plaintiff Curtis is currently serving a 20-year sentence with 10 years of 
parole ineligibility for sexually abusing and taking nude photographs of 
a 14-year-old boy. Curtis also has a prior pedophiliac conviction: he 
received a sentence of probation for sexually assaulting a 15-year old 
boy. 
 
2. Prior to 1998, A.D.T.C. officials had authority to prohibit inmates 
from 
possessing certain obscene publications pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:18- 
4.9(a)(6). However, before taking such action, officials had to find that 
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Whitman signed the bill into law. The statute reads as 
follows: 
 
        a. As used in this act, "sexually oriented material" 
       means any description, narrative account, display, or 
       depiction of sexual activity or associated anatomical 
       area contained in, or consisting of, a picture or other 
       representation, publication, sound recording, live 
       performance, or film. 
 
        b. An inmate sentenced to a period of confinement 
       in the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center shall not 
       receive, possess, distribute or exhibit within the center 
       sexually oriented material, as defined in subsection a. 
       of this section. Upon the discovery of any such material 
       within the center, the commissioner shall provide for 
       its removal and destruction, subject to a departmental 
       appeal procedure for the withholding or removal of 
       such material from the inmate's possession. 
 
       c. The commissioner shall request an inmate 
       sentenced to confinement in the center to acknowledge 
       in writing the requirements of this act prior to the 
       enforcement of its provisions. Any inmate who violates 
       the provisions of subsection b. of this section shall be 
       subject to on-the-spot sanctions pursuant to rules and 
       regulations adopted by the commissioner. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       [t]he publication contains material which, based upon the 
       experience and professional expertise of correctional 
administrators 
       and judged in the context of a correctional facility and its 
       paramount interest in security, order and rehabilitation: 
 
       i. Taken, as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex; 
 
       ii. Lacks, as a whole, serious literary, artistic, political or 
scientific 
       value; and 
 
       iii. Depicts, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct including 
       patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sex 
       acts, masturbation, excretory functions, lewd exhibition of the 
       genitals, sadism or masochism. 
 
N.J.A.C. 10A:18-4.9(a)(6). This section still applies in New Jersey's 
other 
correctional facilities. 
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        d. A person who sells or offers for sale the material 
       prohibited in subsection b. either for purposes of 
       possession or viewing or who receives, possesses, 
       distributes or exhibits any text, photograph, film, video 
       or any other reproduction or reconstruction which 
       depicts a person under 18 years of age engaging in a 
       prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an 
       act as defined in section 2 of P.L. 1992, c. 7 (C.2A:30B- 
       2), within the center shall be considered to have 
       committed an inmate prohibited act and be subject to 
       sanctions pursuant to rules and regulations adopted 
       by the commissioner. 
 
N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10. 
 
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983, 
alleging that the statute violated their constitutional rights. 
They named as defendants Peter Verniero, then the 
Attorney General of New Jersey;3 Jack Terhune, 
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections; and William Plantier, Superintendent of the 
A.D.T.C. (collectively, "Defendants"). 
 
The District Court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement 
of N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 pending a final determination 
regarding the statute's constitutionality. Waterman v. 
Verniero, 12 F.Supp.2d 364 (D.N.J. 1998) (Waterman I). The 
District Court later concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined Defendants 
from enforcing it. Waterman v. Verniero, 12 F.Supp.2d 378 
(D.N.J. 1998) (Waterman II). Defendants appealed. 
 
Several weeks after this case was argued on appeal, 
counsel for Defendants advised the Court, pursuant to Fed. 
R. App. P. 28(j), that New Jersey had promulgated 
regulations implementing N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10. The 
regulations significantly narrow the statute's scope by 
defining many of the operative terms. The regulations 
contain the following definitions: 
 
        "Associated anatomical area" means exposed or 
       unclothed genitalia or female breasts. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. John Farmer, Jr. has since replaced Peter Verniero as Attorney 
General of New Jersey. 
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        "Sexual activity" means actual or simulated ultimate 
       sexual acts including sexual intercourse, oral sex, 
       masturbation, or bestiality. 
 
        "Sexually oriented material" means a picture or other 
       representation, publication, sound recording, live 
       performance or film that contains a description or 
       depiction of sexual activity or associated anatomical 
       area, as these terms are herein defined. 
 
N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9.1 (1999). The regulations also provide 
that "[m]aterials containing a depiction or description of 
sexual activity or an associated anatomical area shall not 
be considered `sexually oriented' unless the material is 
predominantly oriented to such depictions or descriptions." 
N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9.2(b). A publication is considered 
"predominantly oriented to the depiction or description of 
sexual activity or associated anatomical area" only if it 
"features or contains such descriptions or displays on a 
routine or regular basis or promotes itself based upon such 
depictions in the case of individual one-time issues." 
N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9.2(c). 
 
The regulations prescribe the procedures that A.D.T.C. 
staff must follow when notifying inmates that a particular 
publication is prohibited by the statute. N.J.A.C. 10A:18- 
9.3. They also impose sanctions for violations of the 
statute, N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9.5, and exempt from regulation 
all materials deemed to serve a legitimate rehabilitative 
purpose, N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9.4. 
 
II. 
 
Defendants raise two arguments on appeal. First, they 
argue that the District Court erred in finding the statute 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Second, they 
argue that the District Court erred in concluding that the 
statute is not rationally related to a legitimate penological 
interest. Because both of these arguments present 
questions of law, our review is plenary. See United States v. 
Various Computers & Computer Equip., 82 F.3d 582, 589 
(3d Cir. 1996) ("Constitutional interpretations are questions 
of law subject to plenary review."). 
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A. Vagueness and Overbreadth 
 
The District Court declared N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 
unconstitutionally vague4 and overbroad.5 In so doing, the 
Court noted that the statute was unconstitutional 
regardless of whether it was rationally related to a 
legitimate penological interest under Turner v. Safley, 482 
U.S. 78 (1987). See Waterman II, 12 F.Supp.2d at 381 
("Although the Court need not address whether New Jersey 
had a valid penological interest when it passed N.J.S.A. 
2C:47-10, it will briefly discuss the issue because the 
parties have hotly contested the issue and because the 
Court's analysis may aid the New Jersey Legislature if they 
decide to rewrite the statute."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. A law or regulation can be deemed unconstitutionally vague if "men of 
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application. . . ." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 
391 (1926). Although the vagueness doctrine was originally used to 
invalidate--on due process grounds--penal statutes that fail to "define 
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited," Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 357 (1983), courts frequently apply it in the First Amendment 
context. 
 
The vagueness doctrine is similar--though not identical--to the 
doctrine of overbreadth. As with the overbreadth doctrine, a vagueness 
challenge can nullify an ambiguous law that "chills" protected First 
Amendment activities. But unlike the overbreadth doctrine, the 
vagueness doctrine was designed to guarantee "fair and non- 
discriminatory application of the laws, thus reflecting its roots in the 
due 
process clause." Kriemer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown, 
958 F.2d 1242, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
5. A law or regulation is invalid on its face under the overbreadth 
doctrine if it "does not aim specifically at the evils within the 
allowable 
area of control [by the government] but . . . sweeps within its ambit 
other 
[constitutionally protected] activities." Thornill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 
97 (1940). The overbreadth doctrine is an exception to conventional 
standing requirements. It provides that an individual whose conduct 
may be prohibited may challenge a regulation "because [that regulation] 
also threatens others not before the court--those who desire to engage 
in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather 
than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially 
invalid." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985). 
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Defendants now argue that the District Court erred in 
concluding that it could declare the statute 
unconstitutional without first considering whether it was 
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. We 
agree. 
 
Constitutional challenges to laws, regulations, and 
policies governing prison management must be examined 
under the framework of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 
(1987). In Safley, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
"courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent 
problems of prison administration and reform." Id. at 84 
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court set out 
"to formulate a [comprehensive] standard of review for 
prisoners' constitutional claims that is responsive both to 
the `policy of judicial complaints and [to] the need to protect 
constitutional rights.' " Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 406 (1974)). Because vagueness and 
overbreadth challenges embody "constitutional claims," 
they must be analyzed under the four-pronged test 
announced in Safley. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 
U.S. 396 (1974) (analyzing plaintiffs' vagueness claims 
under an evolutionary precursor to the Safley test); Amatel 
v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (addressing 
plaintiffs' overbreadth claims under Safley ), cert. denied, 67 
U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. June 24, 1999) (No. 98-1452); Mauro 
v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d 1137, 1140-1144 (9th Cir.) (analyzing 
plaintiffs' overbreadth claims under Safley ), withdrawn, 
162 F.3d 547 (1998) (ordering rehearing en banc). 
 
Furthermore, the substantial overlap between the Safley 
test and the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth 6 
suggests that the Supreme Court did not intend for those 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Safley test takes into account many of the same factors 
considered under the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. As we 
explain in greater detail later in this opinion, see infra., section 
II.B., 
Safley requires courts to consider (1) whether a rational connection 
exists between the regulation and a neutral, legitimate government 
interest; (2) whether alternative means exist for inmates to exercise the 
constitutional right at issue; (3) what impact the accommodation of the 
right would have on inmates, prison personnel, and allocation of prison 
resources; and (4) whether obvious, easy alternatives exist. Safley, 482 
U.S. at 89-91. 
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doctrines to apply with independent force in the prison- 
litigation context. It would therefore be both redundant and 
inconsistent with Safley to subject N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 to an 
independent challenge under the doctrines of vagueness 
and overbreadth.7 
 
For this reason, we need not address Plaintiffs' vagueness 
and overbreadth challenges separately. Instead, if the 
challenged statute withstands review under Safley, it does 
not violate the Constitution. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 89 
("[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.") The 
District Court erred in concluding otherwise. 
 
B. Reasonable Relation to Legitimate Penological Interests 
 
As the District Court correctly noted, prisoners"do not 
lose their constitutional rights when they become 
incarcerated, and free citizens do not lose their ability to 
`exercis[e] their own constitutional rights by reaching out to 
those on the inside.' " Waterman I, 12 F.Supp.2d. at 371 
(quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). 
Nevertheless, prisoners' constitutional rights are necessarily 
limited. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 
119, 125 (1977) ("The fact of confinement and the needs of 
the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional 
rights, including those derived from the First Amendment, 
which are implicit in incarceration."). 
 
In Safley, the Supreme Court explained that "when a 
prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S. at 89. Safley 
directs courts to assess the overall reasonableness of such 
regulations by weighing four factors. "First, there must be 
a `valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation 
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to 
justify it," and this connection must not be "so remote as to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Counsel for Plaintiffs effectively conceded this point at oral 
argument. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34 ("[T]he truth of the matter is that 
pretty conventional vagueness and overbreadth analysis are built into 
the four factors of [Safley]."). 
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render the policy arbitrary or irrational." Id. at 89-90 
(quoting Block v. Rutherford, 486 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). 
Second, a court must consider whether inmates retain 
alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right. Id. 
at 90. Third, a court must take into account the costs that 
accommodating the right would impose on other inmates, 
guards, and prison resources generally. Id. And fourth, a 
court must consider whether there are alternatives to the 
regulation that "fully accommodate[ ] the prisoner's rights 
at de minimis cost to valid penological interests." Id. at 90- 
91. Although the factors are intended to serve as guides to 
a single reasonableness standard, "the first factor looms 
especially large" because it "tends to encompass the 
remaining factors, and some of its criteria are apparently 
necessary conditions." Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196. 
 
1. Rational Connection to a Legitimate and Neutral 
       Objective 
 
Under the first prong of the Safley test, we must decide 
whether the statute bears a "valid, rational connection" to 
a legitimate and neutral governmental objective. Safley, 482 
U.S. at 89-90 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 
586). Accordingly, we may conclude that the statute fails to 
satisfy this prong if the statute promotes an interest that is 
illegitimate or not neutral, or if the statute bears no "valid, 
rational connection" to the asserted interest. Id. at 89-90. 
 
       a. Legitimacy 
 
Defendants argue that the statute promotes the 
legitimate penological interest of rehabilitation. While the 
District Court acknowledged that "rehabilitation is a valid 
penological interest," it concluded that Defendants' 
explanation of the statute's purpose was pretextual and 
theorized that the statute was motivated more by an 
indignant animus toward sex offenders than a genuine 
attempt to rehabilitate them: 
 
       New Jersey did not have a valid penological interest 
       when it enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 because 
       rehabilitation does not appear to be the true reason 
       why the New Jersey Legislature passed N.J.S.A. 2C:47- 
       10. The legislative history does not mention 
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       rehabilitation, and Dr. Nancy Graffin, the Director of 
       Psychology at the ADTC, did not testify before either 
       the Assembly or the Senate, and learned about the 
       statute after it was enacted. Most importantly, the 
       Department of Corrections formally opposed the statute 
       before Governor Whitman signed it because the 
       Department believed that adult pornography for 
       inmates at the ADTC was a step in the right direction. 
       Thus, the true reason for the enactment of N.J.S.A. 
       2C:47-10 appears to be public outrage over some of the 
       heinous, pedophiliac crimes that occurred in New 
       Jersey. 
 
Waterman II, 12 F.Supp.2d at 381. Thus, the District Court 
treated the dearth of legislative history as conclusive proof 
that the "true" purpose of the statute was not to 
rehabilitate sex offenders, but instead to satisfy the 
widespread "public outrage over some of the heinous, 
pedophiliac crimes that occurred in New Jersey." Id. at 381. 
 
This assessment cannot withstand review. The absence of 
legislative facts has no bearing on whether a statute's 
purpose is legitimate. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 
(1992). Moreover, a time-honored principle of constitutional 
law reminds us that judicial second-guessing of a 
legislature's motives is "generally unwarranted" "absent 
some reason to infer antipathy." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 
93, 97 (1979). Consequently, the fact that the statute's 
"legislative history does not mention rehabilitation" is 
irrelevant. As our en banc court emphasized in Phillips v. 
Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 1997): 
 
       [t]here is a significant difference between the 
       requirement that there be a factual basis for a 
       legislative judgment presented in court when that 
       judgment is challenged and a requirement that such a 
       factual basis have been submitted to the legislative 
       body prior to the enactment of the legislative measure. 
       We have always required the former; we have never 
       required the latter. Whatever level of scrutiny we have 
       applied in a given case, we have always found it 
       acceptable for individual legislators to base their 
       judgments on their own study of the subject matter 
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       of the legislation, their communications with 
       constituents, and their own life experience and 
       common sense so long as they come forward with the 
       required showing in the courtroom once a challenge is 
       raised. . . . We perceive no justification in policy or 
       doctrine for abandoning our traditional approach. 
       Moreover, we believe that insistence on the creation of 
       a legislative record is an unwarranted intrusion into 
       the internal affairs of the legislative branch of 
       governments. 
 
Id. at 178. 
 
In this case, it is beyond dispute that New Jersey has a 
legitimate penological interest in rehabilitating its most 
dangerous and compulsive sex offenders. See O'Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (recognizing 
rehabilitation as a "valid penological objective"); see also 
Waterman II, 12 F.Supp.2d at 381 ("[T]he Court recognizes 
that rehabilitation is a valid penological interest . . . ."). 
Seeing no reason to question Defendants' assertion that the 
statute serves the purpose of promoting the rehabilitative 
efforts of the A.D.T.C., we reject the District Court's 
conclusion that the statute's purpose is illegitimate. 
 
       b. Neutrality 
 
The District Court made no findings concerning the 
statute's neutrality. However, in Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 
U.S. 401 (1989), the Supreme Court made clear that 
Safley's "neutrality" requirement is met if the asserted 
interest is "unrelated to the suppression of expression." Id. 
at 415. As we have already explained, the statute's purpose 
is to enhance the A.D.T.C.'s efforts to rehabilitate New 
Jersey's most serious sex offenders. Because the state's 
interest in rehabilitation is "unrelated to the suppression of 
expression," we conclude that the statute's purpose is 
neutral for purposes of Safley. 
 
       c. Means-End Fit 
 
We may conclude that the statute bears no "valid, 
rational connection" to rehabilitation if "the logical 
connection between the [statute] and the asserted goal is so 
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remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational." 
Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-90. This standard is similar to 
rational-basis review, under which a statutory classification 
can be declared unconstitutional only where the 
relationship of the classification to its asserted goal is "so 
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or 
irrational." Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11 (1992). See Amatel, 
156 F.3d at 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he similarity 
between Safley's phrasing and the language of rational 
basis review suggests to us that, as far as the means-end 
fit is concerned, Safley's standard is, if not identical, 
something very similar."). The legislature's judgment 
therefore need not be perfect, just rational. 
 
During proceedings before the District Court, Defendants 
presented evidence that the statute bears a "valid, rational 
connection," Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-90, to the rehabilitation 
of sex offenders. They submitted affidavits from two 
psychologists--Dr. Nancy Graffin, Ph.D., and Dr. Timothy 
Foley, Ph.D.--both of whom testified that pornographic 
material threatened to thwart the effectiveness of the 
treatment given to A.D.T.C. inmates. 
 
Dr. Graffin testified that throughout their treatment, 
A.D.T.C. inmates are required to develop an advanced 
understanding of the consequences of their sexual assaults 
and recognize cognitive distortions associated with their 
sexual abuse. App. at 125-29. She further explained that 
during the final treatment phase, inmates are required to 
demonstrate victim sensitivity and the ability to connect 
emotionally with others. Id. Finally, Dr. Graffin explained 
that sexually oriented material can be a threat to A.D.T.C. 
treatment because pornographic material tends to objectify 
the individuals depicted. Id. 
 
Similarly, Dr. Foley testified that sexually explicit 
material could be harmful to A.D.T.C. inmates, reasoning 
that exposure to such material can lead the inmates to 
believe that intimacy can be achieved only through sexual 
release and that a victim is necessary for sexual enjoyment. 
App. at 135-140. He also concluded that pornography is 
particularly dangerous to A.D.T.C. inmates because some 
sex offenders tend to use such material to supply and 
fortify their fantasies and are likely to engage in a series of 
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"trial runs" of these fantasies once they are released from 
prison. Id. 
 
In addition to the affidavits of Drs. Graffin and Foley, 
Defendants also referred the Court to "a considerable body 
of research supporting the view that the sexual material 
prohibited by the statute is harmful to prisoners and poses 
a danger to society when these sex offenders consume it." 
Br. for Appellants at 16, 31. 
 
Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that the 
statute did not bear a "valid, rational connection" to a 
legitimate and neutral governmental objective. See 
Waterman II, 12 F.Supp.2d at 381. In so doing, the Court 
suggested that the lack of consensus among psychologists 
invalidated Defendants' contention that the statute 
enhanced the state's efforts to rehabilitate its most serious 
sex offenders. The Court wrote: 
 
       After reviewing the experts' affidavits, the Courtfinds 
       that the psychology field has not yet reached an 
       agreement on how sexually oriented materials affect 
       the treatment of sex offenders. Although the Court is 
       not equipped to resolve that issue, it has determined 
       that plaintiffs' experts are more convincing because 
       their position is more reasonable. Given the 
       disagreement in the psychology field on this issue, it 
       seems most appropriate for psychologists to determine 
       whether to use such materials on a case-by-case basis. 
       On the other hand, flatly prohibiting such materials, as 
       N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 proposes to do, would deny certain 
       sex offenders valuable treatment. Thus, N.J.S.A. 
       2C:47-10 actually diminishes New Jersey's purported 
       interest in rehabilitation. The Court concludes that the 
       statute is not rationally related to rehabilitation 
       because plaintiffs' experts' recommendation that the 
       materials be reviewed on a case-by-case basis is a 
       better method for handling the materials than that 
       provided by the statute and New Jersey's experts. 
 
Id. at 382. Simply stated, the District Court based its 
conclusion on the fact that "[t]he experts in this case 
disagree on the effect that the materials will have on the 
treatment of the inmates at the A.D.T.C." Id. at 381; see 
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also id. at 382 ("The psychology field has not yet reached 
an agreement on how sexually oriented materials affect the 
treatment of sex offenders."). 
 
Notably, the Court did not conclude that the opinions 
expressed by the Defendants' experts were irrational or 
unreasonable. Rather, the Court opined that the theories 
advanced by the Plaintiffs' experts were "better," "more 
convincing," and "more reasonable," id . at 382, thereby 
suggesting that the opinions expressed by the Defendants' 
experts were in fact reasonable, but simply less so than the 
Plaintiffs' experts' opinions. 
 
The District Court applied the wrong standard, replacing 
the New Jersey legislature's policy decisions with its own 
"more reasonable" judgment. In so doing, the Court failed 
to accord the legislature's judgment the deference to which 
it is entitled.8 The appropriate question is not whether the 
theories advanced by either party's experts are"more 
reasonable" and "more convincing," but instead whether 
"the logical connection between the [statute] and the 
asserted goal" of improving the A.D.T.C.'s sex offender 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Two factors present in this case compel us to examine the New Jersey 
legislature's judgment deferentially. First, the statute governs the 
management of one of New Jersey's prisons. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Safley, determinations related to prison management are 
"peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches 
of government," and must therefore be reviewed with a "policy of judicial 
restraint." Safley, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). That policy applies with even greater vigor here because 
"[w]here a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . 
additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate . . . 
authorities." 
Id. 
 
Second, in enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10, the legislature has 
"undertake[n] to act in [an] area[ ] fraught with . . . scientific 
uncertainties." Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974). The 
Supreme Court has explained that in such circumstances, "legislative 
options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to 
rewrite legislation, even assuming arguendo, that judges with more 
direct exposure to the problem might make wiser choices." Id. at 427. 
Stated differently, courts are bound to give the legislature greater 
deference--not less--where the latter has "undertake[n] to act in [an] 
area[ ]" where "experts disagree." Id. at 427. 
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rehabilitation program is "so remote as to render the policy 
arbitrary or irrational." Safley, 482 U.S. at 89-90. 
 
In a recent decision upholding a statute that effectively 
prohibits the distribution of sexually explicit material in 
federal prisons, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged its deferential 
role under Safley. The Court explained that the legislative 
judgment underlying the challenged statute need not be 
perfect to be deemed rationally connected to a legitimate 
penological interest: 
 
       The legislative judgment is that pornography adversely 
       affects rehabilitation. It does not matter whether we 
       agree with the legislature, only whether we find its 
       judgment rational. The question for us is not whether 
       the regulation in fact advances the government 
       interest, only whether the legislature might reasonably 
       have thought that it would. 
 
Amatel, 156 F.3d at 199 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 
We agree with the Amatel panel's analysis; as long as the 
statute is rational, it clears Safley'sfirst hurdle. Thus, 
Defendants need only demonstrate that "the [New Jersey] 
legislature might reasonably have thought that [the statute] 
would" advance the interest of rehabilitating the sex 
offenders housed at the A.D.T.C. Id. at 199. 
 
We conclude that the Defendants made such a showing 
and that New Jersey "could rationally have seen a 
connection between pornography and rehabilitative values." 
Id. at 199. Many psychologists--Defendants' experts 
included--have expressed well-reasoned opinions 
supporting Defendants' argument that the statute will 
enhance the A.D.T.C.'s rehabilitative efforts. These opinions 
provide a sufficient basis for us to conclude that the statute 
bears a valid rational connection to a legitimate penological 
interest. 
 
Moreover, "[c]ommon sense tells us that prisoners are 
more likely to develop the now-missing self-control and 
respect for others if prevented from poring over pictures 
that are themselves degrading and disrespectful." Id. at 
199. Thus, even without the opinions of Defendants' 
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experts, we could conclude that New Jersey acted rationally 
in enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 because the theoretical 
underpinnings of the statute 
 
       share[ ] at least a core with ideas that have a lineage of 
       a few centuries, perhaps millennia, stressing the 
       desirability of deferring sexual gratification, of 
       sublimation of sexual impulses, of channeling sexual 
       expression into long-term relationships of caring and 
       affection, of joining eros to agape. The supposition that 
       exclusion of pornography from prisons will have much 
       of an impact in this direction may be optimistic, but it 
       is not irrational. 
 
Id. at 199. 
 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Amatel is "consistent with 
th[e] well-established line of cases" applying Safley. Br. for 
Appellees at 23. However, they attempt to distinguish 
Amatel by pointing out that the statute upheld in Amatel 
" `is not enforced directly,' " but is instead enforced 
pursuant to " `regulations defining the terms of the 
proscription and significantly narrowing its scope.' " Id. 
(quoting Amatel, 156 F.3d at 194). 
 
Whatever force this argument carried prior to the 
issuance of the new implementing regulations, we see no 
basis for the argument now. As previously noted, New 
Jersey has now promulgated regulations "defining the 
terms of the proscription and significantly narrowing [the 
statute's] scope." Id. (quoting Amatel, 156 F.3d at 194); see 
N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9 (narrowing the operative terms of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10). Thus, Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish 
Amatel fails.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Plaintiffs liken N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 to a prison regulation that was 
declared unconstitutional in Mauro v. Arpaio, 147 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
1998). However, the Ninth Circuit has withdrawn its opinion in that case 
pending rehearing en banc. See 162 F.3d 547 (1998). 
 
But even if the Mauro opinion had not been withdrawn, it would not 
affect the outcome of this case. The Mauro panel's holding was based on 
the the defendants' failure to demonstrate that the regulation was 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. As the panel 
noted, the defendants' evidence amounted to little more than a 
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We are satisfied that N.J.S.A. S 2C:47-10 bears a valid, 
rational connection to the legitimate penological interest 
put forward to justify it, and we hold that the District Court 
erred in concluding otherwise. 
 
2. Alternative Means 
 
The second factor requires us to assess the availability of 
alternative means of exercising the right at stake. For 
obvious reasons, this factor tends to favor plaintiffs where 
the alleged right is defined narrowly, and where the scope 
of the restriction is construed broadly. Thus, "if the `right' 
at stake is defined in terms of the materials excluded by the 
ban, any regulation will come up short." Amatel, 156 F.3d 
at 192. 
 
Not surprisingly, Plaintiffs define the right narrowly, and 
read the statute broadly. Br. for Appellees at 44-45. While 
not commenting directly on the scope of the right, the 
District Court construed the statute broadly, finding that it 
"could potentially prohibit the inmates from reading or 
viewing many legitimate publications." Waterman I, 12 
F.Supp.2d at 376. The Court feared that (1) "the word `any' 
ensures that the statute is overbroad because `any' 
mandates that no exceptions will be made to the statute" 
and (2) "the words `any associated anatomical area' appears 
to mean that every publication that contains a body part 
that is associated with sexual activity is banned." Id. 
According to the District Court, the statute could be read 
as allowing A.D.T.C. officials to prohibit everything from the 
Bible to legal publications. Id. 
 
We find the District Court's analysis of this factor to be 
unreasonable and inconsistent with Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
490 U.S. 401 (1989). In Thornburgh, the Court upheld a 
regulation that barred all "sexually explicit material which 
by its nature or content poses a threat to the security, good 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
conclusory assertion that "inmates will misbehave when using materials 
depicting frontal nudity." Mauro, 147 F.3d at 1143. Unlike the 
defendants in Mauro, the Defendants before us--like the defendants in 
Amatel--have met their burden under Safley. Mauro is therefore 
distinguishable. 
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order, or discipline of the institution, or facilitates criminal 
activity." Id. at 405 n.5. The Court concluded that the 
second Safley factor was "clearly satisfied" because "the 
regulations permit a broad range of publications to be sent, 
received, and read." Id. at 418. Significantly, the Court saw 
no problem with the breadth or ambiguity of the regulation. 
 
The Thornburgh Court also explained that the relevant 
right "must be viewed sensibly and expansively." Id. at 417. 
Here, it was not "sensible" for the District Court to conclude 
that the statute was broad enough to forbid prisoners from 
reading the Bible, legal publications, or other non- 
pornographic books. See Waterman I, 12 F.Supp.2d at 376 
("[T]he Court agrees with plaintiffs' argument that the 
statute prohibits them from reading the Bible, fashion 
magazines, books, and cases."). We therefore disagree with 
the District Court's conclusion and conclude that N.J.S.A. 
2C:47-10 provides Plaintiffs with an alternative means of 
exercising their constitutional rights. 
 
Even if we were otherwise inclined to reach the opposite 
conclusion, the recently promulgated regulations 
implementing the statute would foreclose any need for us to 
do so. As noted, the regulations significantly narrow the 
statute's broad scope by defining many of its operative 
terms, providing that 
 
        "Associated anatomical area" means exposed or 
       unclothed genitalia or female breasts. 
 
        "Sexual activity" means actual or simulated ultimate 
       sexual acts including sexual intercourse, oral sex, 
       masturbation, or bestiality. 
 
        "Sexually oriented material" means a picture or other 
       representation, publication, sound recording, live 
       performance or film that contains a description or 
       depiction of sexual activity or associated anatomical 
       area, as these terms are herein defined.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The regulations also explain that "[m]aterials containing a depiction 
or description of sexual activity or an associated anatomical area shall 
not be considered `sexually oriented' unless the material is 
predominantly oriented to such depictions or descriptions." N.J.A.C. 
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N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9.1 (1999). Thus, the regulations eliminate 
any concern that Plaintiffs will be left without alternative 
means of exercising their constitutional rights. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 satisfies 
Safley's second prong. 
 
3. Impact of Accommodation on Prison 
       Resources/Absence of Alternatives 
 
Safley's third prong requires us to evaluate the adverse 
impact that accommodating the Plaintiffs' asserted rights 
would have "on guards and other inmates, and on the 
allocation of prison resources." Safley, 482 U.S. at 90. 
Similarly, the fourth prong requires us to determine 
whether there are alternatives that can accommodate the 
right "at de minimis costs to valid penological interests." Id. 
at 91. As the District Court noted before issuing the 
preliminary injunction, Defendants' "arguments on[the 
third and fourth] factors overlap." Waterman I, 12 
F.Supp.2d at 375. We will therefore discuss them together. 
 
The District Court declined to address Safley 's third and 
fourth prongs when issuing the permanent injunction, 
concluding that "the ruling that New Jersey does not have 
a legitimate penological interest renders those factors 
moot." Waterman II, 12 F.Supp.2d at 382 n.2. However, 
Plaintiffs maintain that reasonable alternatives are available 
and argue that the A.D.T.C. staff "could review incoming 
publications [on a case-by-case basis and selectively 
prohibit] materials [found to be] harmful to rehabilitation." 
Br. for Appellees at 46-47. 
 
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, Safley  does not 
impose a least-restrictive-alternative test. 492 U.S. at 90. 
Consequently, we need not conclude that no less restrictive 
alternatives are available. Id. Where accommodation of the 
asserted right would have a "ripple effect" on prison staff, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10A:18-9.2(b). A publication is only considered"predominantly oriented 
to the depiction or description of sexual activity or associated 
anatomical 
area" if it "features or contains such descriptions or displays on a 
routine or regular basis or promotes itself based upon such depictions in 
the case of individual one-time issues." N.J.A.C. 10A:18-9.2(c). 
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courts are encouraged to give particular deference to the 
informed discretion of corrections officials. Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 
Defendants maintain that no reasonable alternatives are 
available. They point out that, while some inmates might 
not be adversely affected by limited access to pornography, 
any limited distribution would have to be carried out on the 
basis of a case-by-case review. Such a review, Defendants 
argue, "would have to be specifically controlled and 
monitored by a qualified therapist, thereby causing an 
undue burden on a staff already inundated with sex 
offender cases." Br. for Appellants at 35. Defendants also 
assert that even if the A.D.T.C. were sufficiently staffed to 
enable it to conduct a case-by-case review, a limited 
distribution would be impossible to control since"prisoners 
are more than likely to pass their material to other 
prisoners." Id. at 36. 
 
We agree. The costs of the case-by-case alternative 
proposed by Plaintiffs would be "far from de minimis." 
Amatel, 156 F.3d at 201 ("The most obvious alternative is 
a detailed prisoner-by-prisoner (and presumably 
publication-by-publication) sifting to determine whether a 
particular publication will harm the rehabilitation of a 
particular prisoner. The costs of this approach seem far 
from de minimis."). Moreover, any attempt to accommodate 
the Plaintiffs' asserted rights would have an unduly 
burdensome effect "on guards . . . and on the allocation of 
prison resources." Safley, 482 U.S. at 90. 
 
In sum, having analyzed the statute under the four- 
pronged test announced in Safley, we conclude that 
N.J.S.A. 2C:47-10 is "reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests," id. at 89, andfind that the District 
Court erred in concluding otherwise. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the 
District Court and remand for the entry of judgment in 
favor of the Defendants. 
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